Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1996

A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law , in 90 Northwestern University Law Review 977
(1996).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2215

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Sun Sep 25 16:46:54 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Keith N. Hylton, Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law , 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977
(1995-1996).
ALWD 7th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law , 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 977
(1995-1996).
APA 7th ed.
Hylton, K. N. (1995-1996). Missing markets theory of tort law Northwestern University
Law Review, 90(3), 977-1008.
Chicago 17th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, "Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law ," Northwestern University Law
Review 90, no. 3 (1995-1996): 977-1008
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, "Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law " (1995-1996) 90:3 Nw U L Rev
977.
AGLC 4th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, 'Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law ' (1995-1996) 90(3) Northwestern
University Law Review 977
MLA 9th ed.
Hylton, Keith N. "Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law ." Northwestern University Law
Review, vol. 90, no. 3, 1995-1996, pp. 977-1008. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Keith N. Hylton, 'Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law ' (1995-1996) 90 Nw U L Rev 977
Provided by:
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Copyright 1996 by Northwestern University, School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 90, No. 3

A MISSING MARKETS THEORY OF TORT LAW
Keith N. Hylton*
1.

INTRODUCTION

An unreflective reading of the tort doctrine governing abnormally dangerous activities' suggests that the purpose of strict liability,
in this area, is to reduce the scale of such activities. Economic theory
has provided an elaboration of this explanation; it tells us that under
strict liability and under negligence, potential injurers will exercise
reasonable precaution, 2 in which "reasonable" is determined by the
Learned Hand formula for negligence3 However, only under strict
liability will the scale of the abnormally dangerous activity be reduced. 4 The reason is that under negligence, a potential injurer who
complies with the due-care standard will not be required to pay damages to compensate for injuries, while under strict liability, injurers are
required to pay damages even when they have exercised reasonable
precaution. Potential strict liability injurers, faced with damages even
when exercising reasonable precaution, respond by reducing their
scale of activity.
This economic rationale of abnormally dangerous activity doctrine is flawed, however, because it is internally inconsistent. Strict
liability gives potential injurers an incentive to take all injuries into
account in choosing the scale of activity, not just those injuries resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable precaution, and according to
the theory this leads them to choose the socially desirable (i.e., optimal) scale. 5 But this suggests that strict liability should be closer to
the rule rather than the exception, particularly in areas where victim
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I thank Jennifer Arlen, Charlotte
Crane, David Haddock, Tom Merrill, Dan Polsby, Marshall Shapo, and Oliver Williamson for
helpful comments. Daniel Hurtado and Norene McWilliams helped with the legal research.
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977).

2 On the equivalence of strict liability and negligence with respect to precaution, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 160-61 (2d ed. 1977); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1980).
3 I refer to the mathematical formulation introduced by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). For an economic justification of the
Hand formula, see RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9

(1982).
4 Shavell, supra note 2, at 2-3.
5 Id. By socially desirable, I mean the same thing as economically optimal, economically
efficient, or wealth-maximizing. The wealth-maximizing level of activity minimizes the sum of
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precaution is not an issue.6 The theory does not explain pockets of
strict liability, such as the doctrine governing abnormally dangerous
activities: it forces us to ask why they are pockets at all. The theory
suggests that negligence should be the exception to a general rule of
strict liability.
This mismatch between theory and doctrine is observed more
generally in all deterrence-based and virtually all economically oriented theories of tort law. For the common thread running through
such theories is that tort law is designed primarily to deter careless
behavior by shifting, or internalizing, victim losses to injurers.7 The
natural implication of this theory is that tort doctrine, i.e., what courts
say, is relatively unimportant.8
This Article provides a framework for reconciling the tension between tort doctrine and economic theory, and for addressing the general failure of economically oriented theories to come to grips with
doctrine at a detailed level. My claim is that tort doctrine should be
viewed as a response to the incompleteness of markets, or more generally the problem of missing markets. Because of market incompleteness, some of the benefits as well as costs associated with
activities will be shifted or "externalized" to third parties. Tort doctrine reflects sensitivity to the externalization of benefits and costs. It
can therefore be understood only by examining both types of
externalization. 9
I provide a framework that explains pockets of strict liability,
negligence, and two other areas referred to below as "property rules"
avoidance and accident costs. See John Prather Brown, Toward A Theory of Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973). On the relevant notion of economic efficiency, see infra note 23.
6 John Prather Brown demonstrated that the negligence rule is optimal when the probability
of an injury can be reduced by precaution on the part of either the injurer or the victim. See
Brown, supra note 5, at 340-42. But the negligence rule extends to areas such as medical malpractice in which victim precaution is clearly not an issue. The puzzle this Article seeks to explain is why the domain of the negligence rule is greater than the standard economic models of
accidents suggest.
7 This theory of tort law is suggested in chapter 3 of OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown and Co. 1881). The theory is explicit in the work of Calabresi and
Posner. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENrs (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Theory
of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
8 A common critique of economically oriented theories such as Judge Posner's is that they
tend to ignore or downplay doctrinal complexities. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WroTE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1985). There is evidence for this in the law and economics literature. Calabresi's book, a general critique of the tort system, has very little to say
about tort doctrine. See CALABREST, supra note 7. Posner's theory, in a nutshell, seems to be
that the complexities of doctrine can be largely avoided, and tort case outcomes can be understood by examining the facts and applying the Learned Hand formula. See Posner, supra note 7.
9 An independent paper by Richard Epstein (published as this Article was in progress)
emphasizes the importance of benefits in understanding tort law. See Richard A. Epstein, The
Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle,67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369 (1994). However, Epstein's paper does
not develop an alternative economic theory of tort law.
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and "weak negligence rules." I use the term property rule in the same
sense that it was used originally by Calabresi and Melamed' 0-to refer to areas in which strict liability applies and the victim can enjoin
the injurer's behavior. The term weak negligence refers to areas in
which defenses to a negligence claim, such as assumption of risk, are
available and, given the fact patterns, quite likely to be persuasive. I
apply the theory to nuisance doctrine and show that it can be justified
at a detailed level."
The Article is organized as follows: Part II presents a critique of
prevailing economic theories of tort law. Part III presents the framework of this Article. Part IV applies the framework to nuisance doctrine. The final section, Part V, compares the framework of this
Article to the reciprocity theory of George Fletcher.' 2 The theory of
this Article is capable of explaining all of the features of tort law explained by Fletcher's reciprocity theory, and goes further by making
sense of areas that Fletcher's theory seems incapable of explaining.
II. Two ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LIABILITY

AND

PROBLEMS RAISED

Two theories of the economic function of liability rules underlie
much of the writing in the positive economic theory of tort law. One
focuses on the structure of transaction costs as the primary determinant of liability rules, for example, whether strict liability or a negligence rule will be observed in an area. I refer to this below as the
transaction cost theory. The other, which I refer to as the internalization theory, emphasizes the goal of deterrence, specifically the regulation of care levels, in explaining the differences between areas in
which negligence and those in which strict liability is the rule.
10 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-

ity: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. Rnv. 1089 (1972).
11 Surprisingly few attempts have been made to justify nuisance doctrine. Perhaps the first
to suggest that nuisance doctrine could be justified on economic grounds was Ronald Coase in
his critique of externality theory. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 19-23 (1960). A corrective justice theory was provided in Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law:
CorrectiveJustice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). The only attempt
to provide a somewhat detailed positive economic theory of nuisance doctrine, of which I am
aware, is William D. Manson, A Re-examination of Nuisance Law, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

185 (1985), which is broadly consistent with the theory presented in this Article. For criticisms of
Manson's argument, see Lawrence H. White, Economics and Nuisance Law: Comment on Manson, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 213 (1985).

Most of the economic analysis applied to nuisance law has been normative theory, examining in particular the desirability of injunctive versus damage remedies. See Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IowA L. REV. 775 (1986); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980); see also Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking
FundamentalAssumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1977).
12 George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
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A.

The Transaction Cost Theory

The transaction cost model is based on the work of Ronald
Coase 13 and received its first careful exposition by Calabresi and Melamed. 14 Calabresi and Melamed sought to use the structure of transaction costs to explain areas in which one observes "liability rules,"
"property rules," and "inalienability rules." Liability rules require the
nonholder of an entitlement to compensate the holder at the market
rate (as determined by the court) for any nonconsensual transfer of
the entitlement. Property rules allow the entitlement holder to enjoin
the nonholder's activity, and may impose strict or criminal liability for
nonconsensual transfers of the entitlement. An inalienability rule prevents the courts from enforcing any voluntary transfer between the
entitlement holder and the nonholder and may go so far as to prohibit
any sale of the entitlement. Since this Article is not concerned with
inalienability, I limit my discussion to the distinction between property and liability rules.
Because property rules are observed in areas where transaction
costs are low, bargaining over the transfer of an entitlement is likely to
occur. Transaction costs include the cost of defining the entitlement,
determining its value, and bargaining over its transfer. These costs are
likely to be low in areas where the scope of the holder's claim is easily
delineated, such as the boundary to a piece of land. The power to
enjoin a taking forces the nonholder to meet the asking price in order
to transfer the good from the holder. In the absence of such protection the nonholder would be able to expropriate part of the value of
the holder's entitlement. 15
This description is to be contrasted with the case of an entitlement to clean air. The scope of the holder's claim in this case would
be hard to limit, and as a result the value of the entitlement would be
hard to determine. Here, according to Calabresi and Melamed, the
law provides a liability rule that allows the nonholder to transfer without the holder's consent and to pay a market price for the transfer of
the entitlement.
This framework was expanded by Merrill in his examination of
nuisance doctrine. 16 He further argued that the logic of the transaction cost model explained the differences between trespass and nuisance doctrines. Merrill noted that one observes strict liability under
13 Coase, supra note 11.

14 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10.

15 The risk of such expropriation would, in turn, reduce incentives to use property productively and would create other "demoralization" costs. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "JustCompensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967).

16 Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining PropertyRights, 14

J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
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trespass, while a balancing rule governs liability under nuisance law.
A strict liability rule is consistent with the transaction cost model because it makes it easier to evaluate the entitlement, so that parties can
bargain over its price.
Merrill also noted that the transaction cost framework explains
the traditional requirement that the invasion be "direct" in order to
support a trespass claim. 17 Direct invasions under this theory are
those that violate the clear boundary of an easily defined entitlement.
Invasions that are not of this nature-such as gas' 8 or smoke 19 emitted from a nearby factory and carried by the wind-should be classified as indirect. Obviously there will be cases in which the distinction
between a direct and indirect invasion will not be obvious, 20 but the
theoretical necessity of a such a distinction should be clear. Given the
existence of property rule protection, its use must therefore be limited
to those areas in which the scope of the holder's claim can be easily
defined.
B.

The Internalization Theory

The internalization theory has been used by Landes and Posner
to explain why strict liability is observed in some areas and not in
others. 21 Their discussions have emphasized the different effects of
strict liability and negligence on care and activity levels. Care refers
to instantaneous precautionary behavior, such as looking both ways
before crossing a street. Activity refers to the decision to participate
in an activity that may generate injuries. The decision to drive, or the
decision to drive frequently rather than rarely, are examples of activity level choices.2
17 The direct-indirect distinction corresponds to the distinction between trespass and case,
for which the latter required proof of negligence or intent. Blasting rocks onto another's land
would be direct, while vibrations from the concussion of a blast would be indirect. See WiLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 65 (4th ed. 1971).
18 E.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682 (N.C. 1953); Waschak v. Moffat, 109
A.2d 310 (Pa. 1954).
19 McKinney v. Riley, 197 A.2d 218 (N.H. 1964); Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 229 P. 306
(Wash. 1924).
20 E.g., Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435, 438-39 (Iowa 1942) (nuisance involving
gas and odors: "The line of demarcation between private nuisance and trespass is not always
clear. Under certain circumstances such as in some cases involving the flooding of land there
may be both a trespass and a nuisance."). The difficulty in drawing the line is illustrated by
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959), in which an invasion by invisible fluoride particulates was held a to be a trespass.
21 WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE OF TORT LAW 64-

73 (1987).
22 There is really a spectrum of choices ranging between the instantaneous, nondurable precautionary investments, and long-term, durable precautionary investments. In the case of driving, the decision to purchase a car of given safety attributes is on the durable end of the
spectrum. The decision to have the brakes checked is an intermediate level of durable precau-
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According to the internalization theory, strict liability will be ob-

served in areas in which a reduction in the activity level is socially
desirable.2 3 The reason for this is that a strict liability rule forces the
tortfeasor to take potential losses into account when choosing an activity level, and therefore leads to lower activity levels than are observed under the negligence rule.24 If courts operate without error
and litigation is costless, both of which are standard assumptions of
the internalization theory, injurers will comply with the negligence
rule and therefore will not be held liable for injuries.2 5
C. Questions Raised by the Theories
The transaction cost and internalization theories are not unrelated. Both rely on assumptions concerning the structure of transaction costs. The transaction cost model is explicit about these
assumptions. The internalization model implicitly assumes that transaction costs prevent potential tortfeasors and their victims from mak-

ing ex ante agreements that fix optimal care and activity levels.
The mere existence of the two theories implies that neither provides a coherent positive theory of tort doctrine. For example, the
transaction cost theory provides a poor explanation of the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher.2 6 Under the Rylands doctrine, the injurer is held

strictly liable for injuries flowing from activities that are "unusually
dangerous" or "nonnatural. ' '2 7 These requirements cannot be explained by transaction cost theory. 28 Transaction cost theory relies on
tionary behavior. On the other extreme is the decision to hold one's foot near the brake in case
something should appear suddenly from the side of the road.
It is clearly artificial to treat precautionary investments as if they fall into one of two categories-either care or activity. But the essential features of the choice problem are captured in this
framework without losing much. Expanding the number of categories of precautionary behavior
would not alter the conclusions of a simpler model that uses only two categories of precautionary
investment.
23 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 70. I will use the term "socially desirable,"
"efficient," and "optimal" interchangeably in the remainder of this Article. The definition is
now fairly standard in the law and economics literature: a move from regime A to regime B is
"desirable" or "efficient" if all players would still prefer B to A even after the winners have
compensated the losers. This is known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and for a non-technical discussion, see RICHARD A. POsNER, THm EcoNoMics OF Jus-ncF 48-87 (1981). For a more ad-

vanced treatment and critique, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Little's Critiqueof Welfare Economics, 41
AM. ECON. Rav. 923, 923-32 (1951).
24 Shavell, supra note 2, at 2-3.
25 Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigationand Legal Errorunder Negligence, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 433 (1990).

26 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
27 "[T]he rule of Rylands v. Fletcher is that the defendant will be liable when he damages
another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained .... " PROSSER, supra note 17, at 508.
28 Merrill, supra note 16, at 39-40, comes very close to admitting that transaction cost theory
provides a poor explanation of the Rylands doctrine.
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the structure of transaction costs to explain whether a liability rule will
apply to a given type of accidental injury and if so, what type of liability rule will apply. Transaction costs, however, bear no relation to the
"naturalness" of the injurer's activity. The Rylands doctrine is, at
29
least superficially, consistent with the internalization model. Similarly, what the transaction cost model explains best-the existence of
property rule protection-the internalization theory seems incapable
of justifying. A rule of strict liability should be sufficient under the
internalization theory.
Other questions are left unanswered by the two theories. The
transaction cost theory does not explain the existence of areas where
transaction costs are low, and yet there is no property rule. Defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress are examples. The
law does not allow an individual to enjoin communicative activity that
provide a rule of strict liabilmay hurt his reputation, nor does the law
30
ity to compensate the victim of a libel.
Further, the transaction cost model does not provide a good explanation of the role of intent in nuisance doctrine. Recall that the
transaction cost model posits that the power to enjoin the defendant's
activity will be observed when, because transaction costs are low, it is
feasible for the defendant to bargain for the property of the plaintiff.
One could argue, then, that nuisance law, if it is to be explained by the
transaction cost model, should make some inquiry into the defendant's intent in order to distinguish cases in which the tortfeasor attempted to expropriate the plaintiff's property from those in which no
such effort was involved. But this theory would suggest that the defendant's intent would be most relevant in cases in which injunctive
relief is sought, which is inconsistent with the doctrine. In addition,
the doctrine clearly does not require evidence of an intent to expropriate property; it looks only for an intent to be involved in the offending
activity. 31
29 Though, the consistency can be questioned because it is difficult to square the inappropriateness requirement of Rylands with the internalization model.
30 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Before the constitutionalization of
American defamation law, by cases such as New York 7imes, the standard governing an intentional publication of defamatory material was strict liability, which seems to be inconsistent with
the assertion in the text. See PRossER, supranote 17, at 771. However, the common-law rule of
strict liability for defamation bore little resemblance to other strict liability rules, such as the
Rylands doctrine. Defenses of truth, privilege (of various sorts), or fair comment could be asserted. See, eg., id. at 776-96. In addition, under the common-law rule a defendant would be
held to have published a defamatory statement only if its communication to a third party was
foreseeable. Huth v. Huth, 3 K.B. 32 (1915). The common-law standard of liability for defamation was not nearly as unforgiving as a rule of absolute or strict liability, and was probably
similar in its incentive effects to a negligence rule.
31 E. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Shreffler, 139 F.2d 38,41-42 (6th Cir. 1943) (holding that
an injury is intentional in the eyes of the law if it is foreseeable and preventable); Burr v. Adam
Eidemiller, Inc., 126 A.2d 403, 407 (Pa. 1956) (concluding that the polluting of the plaintiff's
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The internalization principle is equally troubling as a theory of
tort law. Its most significant problem is its suggestion that strict liability should generally be the rule, rather than an exception found only
when the level of activity must be reduced. One might argue that because of the importance of victim precaution, strict liability should not
be the background rule. In light of victim precaution, strict liability
should be the rule when accidents can be best controlled through reducing the activity of the injurer, which would generally require some
comparison of the precaution costs of the injurer and the victim. But
it is clear that the Rylands doctrine does not require an examination
of relative precaution costs. Further, the internalization theory fails to
explain why we should ever observe liability rules that are weaker
than the negligence rule, which we observe in the case of intentional
32
infliction of emotional distress.

III. A

NEW FRAMEWORK

The theory presented by this Article combines features of the
transaction cost and externality theories implicit in the literature on
liability rules. Its distinguishing feature is its assumption that externality is prevalent because of the incompleteness of markets. Its fundamental claim is that tort doctrine can be understood, at a highly
detailed level, as a response to market incompleteness. Liability rules
thus reflect a sensitivity to the externalization of costs and of benefits.
Because strict liability internalizes victim losses associated with
the chosen level of activity, it leads to an optimal (economically efficient, wealth-maximizing, and socially desirable) activity level decision.33 However, if the activity generates external benefits, it is no
longer clear that full internalization of victim losses is desirable. A
negligence rule, which would not internalize all victim losses, may be
socially preferable precisely because it fails to have the same taxing
effect on the activity level as would a strict liability rule.
The argument can be made clearer with the help of a diagram. In
Figure 1, the horizontal axis measures the injurer's level of activity
(e.g., amount of driving). The downward-sloping smooth line captures
"marginal benefits" enjoyed by the injurer from additional activity.
spring by the defendant's slag pile was an intentional invasion if plaintiff knew of it and made no
attempt to correct it); Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Wis. 1969) (stating
that "when the actor knows of the nature of the injury inflicted, [it] is an intentional tort"); see
also William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tax. L. REv. 399, 416-17 (1942).
32 See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (setting out elements of a prima facie case for tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: "(1) Outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) The defendant's intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) The plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme
emotional distress; and (4) Actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
defendant's outrageous conduct").
33 Shavell, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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Put another way, the downward-sloping line measures the amount the
typical injurer would pay to increase his activity level slightly, e.g., an
additional mile of driving each day. Because these are benefits enjoyed by the injurer, I call them "private marginal benefits," and the
curve is labeled PMB. The upward-sloping smooth line, labeled PMC,
captures private marginal costs-the out-of-pocket expenses incurred
by the injurer in extending his activity level an additional unit. The
injurer's privately optimal level occurs at the intersection of PMB and
PMC because the injurer will extend his activity level as long as benefits, on the margin, outweigh costs.
The broken lines in Figure 1 capture external benefits and costs.
The line labeled EMB captures "external marginal benefits"; these are
benefits enjoyed by others (not the injurer) as a result of the injurer
increasing his activity level. For example, if the injurer's car is so fast
or so beautiful that people would pay for the opportunity to see it,
EMB captures the benefits to spectators. The broken line labeled
EMC captures "external marginal costs," which are costs imposed on
others (other than the injurer). Injuries to pedestrians and pollution
would fall under this heading.
The privately optimal level of activity for the injurer is illustrated
by Point A, the intersection between PMB and PMC. However, the
socially optimal level of activity, the level that maximizes the difference between social benefits and costs, is given by Point B, which is
the intersection between the sum of benefits and the sum of costs at
each level of activity (i.e., PMB+EMB equals PMC+EMC). If external costs are offset by external benefits, Point A remains very close to
the socially optimal level of activity. However, if external costs are
much greater than external benefits, as shown at Point C, the socially
optimal level of activity is far below the privately optimal point.
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This suggests that victim losses should be fully internalized, as
would occur under a rule of strict liability, only when the external
costs of the activity (on the margin) exceed the external benefits by a
substantial amount. Since courts cannot measure external costs and
benefits accurately, the practical rule suggested is that strict liability is
the appropriate rule when the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is high.
This rule can be combined with the Calabresi-Melamed transaction cost framework. Under the transaction cost model, full internalization rules such as strict liability are appropriate in areas where the
34
cost of identifying and transferring property rights are low.
Combining the externality concerns discussed above with the
transaction cost model generates the following categories in which the
liability rule should be examined: (1) the external costs exceed (by a
substantial amount) the external benefits associated with the activity,
and transaction costs are low; (2) the external benefits exceed the external costs associated with the activity, and transaction costs are low;
(3) the external costs exceed the external benefits associated with the
activity, and transaction costs are high; and (4) the external benefits
exceed the external costs associated with the activity, and transaction
costs are high.
34 It should be noted, however, that the costs considered in the transaction cost framework
are those associated with the care level decision. Consider, for example, trespass doctrine. Tres-

pass covers a low transaction cost area because it is usually easy for the potential tortfeasor to
identify the victim's property boundary and to negotiate with the victim before crossing it. In
other words, the transaction costs associated with the tortfeasor's instantaneous care decisionwhether to cross the property owner's boundary-are relatively low.
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The first category, in which the ratio of external costs to external
benefits is high, and transaction costs are low, is an area where the
externality concerns suggest that strict liability should apply. An example of such an activity is anything that would be considered an ultrahazardous activity,35 such as blasting in a residential area.36 The
transaction cost model suggests that incentives should be structured so
that the potential tortfeasor has an incentive to negotiate with the potential victim before taking action that may cause injury. A property
rule would provide this incentive because it would allow the victim to
enjoin the tortfeasor's activity. The externality and transaction cost
considerations suggest that a set of rules analogous to trespass doctrine should apply in this area: the tortfeasor should be held strictly
liable for nonconsensual transfers of the victim's entitlement, and the
victim should be able to enjoin the tortfeasor's activity.
Although blasting in a residential area would clearly fall within
this category, the category should include any activity that would give
rise to a valid common-law trespass claim. In other words, nothing in
the theory presented here suggests that the trespass rules should be
restricted only to activities that would be deemed ultrahazardous.
Many examples can be given of activities that are not ultrahazardous,
but if carried beyond the boundary of someone's property are likely to
generate losses far out of proportion to any conceivable benefits to
the property owner. For example, riding a horse is not an ultrahazardous activity, but if A were to ride his horse across B's yard,
the likely harm to B would far outweigh the likely benefit.
The second category, in which the ratio of external costs to external benefits is not high and transaction costs are low, is an area where
the externality model suggests that losses should not be fully internalized. The activities are ones that in general may benefit the class of
likely victims of accidental injury. The transaction cost condition indicates that this is an area in which potential tortfeasors could negotiate
beforehand before taking action that may harm the victim. Forcing
the tortfeasor to negotiate with the victim would allow potential victims (entitlement holders) to be compensated ex ante for the risk of
being harmed. However, it would also allow the potential victim to
hold up the torifeasor for the value of any gain that might come from
35 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) provides as follows:

In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be
considered: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels or others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a
matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (t) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
36 Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that one who engages in "blasting" in a residential neighborhood will be held liable, without proof of negligence, for injury
thereby caused); Federoff v. Harrison Constr., 66 A.2d 817 (Pa. 1949) (same).
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the transfer. Since the external benefits of the activity generally exceed its costs, the transaction cost model suggests that the proper solution in this case would be one in which an eminent domain-like power
is given to the tortfeasor to transfer the entitlement and to compensate the victim at market value.
Two areas of case law that fall in this category are defamation law
and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Property
rules do not apply in these areas, even though the costs to the
tortfeasor of bargaining before acting in a way that may harm the victim are generally low. It is easy, for example, for a newspaper writer
to bargain with an individual for permission to write about him. Strict
liability is not observed 37 because the underlying activity is transferring information, which is a public good in the sense that its consump38
tion by one person does not reduce the amount available to others.
The absence of a strict liability rule effectively subsidizes the production and transfer of information.3 9 Given the incentive problems associated with supplying a public good, the subsidy provided by the
absence of strict liability shifts the activity level of potential
tortfeasors closer to the social optimum. In addition, the liability rule
that applies is a weak negligence rule. In the case of defamation, the
liability rule is negligence unless a privilege applies, in which case only
a "malicious" act can lead to liability. 40 Similarly, a prima facie case
for intentional infliction of emotional distress generally requires inten41
tional and outrageous conduct.
This second category also contains, perhaps as a trivial case, most
injuries arising out of contractual relationships, such as work-related
injuries. In the case of parties, such as an employer and employee,
37 Even before New York Tunes and similar cases, the standard governing an intentional
publication of defamatory material was something less than strict liability (because of the defenses of truth, privilege, and fair comment), although it is often described by commentators as
strict liability. Further, it seems to me that the fundamental reason for applying the type of strict
liability observed in pre-1964 defamation law is the administrative burden of assessing the validity of certain excuses or justifications offered by the defendant (such as ignorance of the victim's
existence). See E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 1910 App. Cas. 20 (H.L.). If the problem of assessing
the validity of the defendant's excuses were not so great, the negligence rule probably would
have been explicitly adopted by common-law courts. In this sense, pre-1964 defamation law in
America is similar to res ipsa doctrine. For a general theory of strict liability that emphasizes the
administrative problem of determining "real" negligence-Le, economically unjustifiable failures to take precautions-see Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error,142 U.
PA. L. REv. 887 (1994).
38 See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRIcE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 478-82 (4th ed. 1988);
POSNER, supra note 23, at 262.
39 POSNER, supra note 23, at 262.
40 This is the standard under the modern cases. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Given the purpose of the
earlier strict liability standard and the defenses and privileges available, the pre-1964 standard of
conduct was probably weaker than a pure negligence rule.
41 See supra note 32 (discussing Eckenrode); see also PROSSER, supra note 17, at 56.
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who accurately perceive the benefits and costs of the contractual relationship, there would be no externalities of any sort. All costs and
benefits would be taken into account by the parties in the contract
formation process. However, if only the party on the receiving end of
the externality correctly perceives it, only costs would be routinely internalized. Although workers' compensation statutes now dominate
the area of work-related injuries, the common-law rule was negligence.42 Because the relationship was contractual, the defense of assumption of risk was generally useful. 43 Given the effect of the
defenses available to the employer," the regime of work-related injuries could be said to be governed by a weak negligence rule.
The fact that the negligence rule is observed in medical malpractice disputes is not inconsistent with this argument. The point is that
in the category of cases at issue, property and strict liability rules will
not be observed even though transaction costs are low.
The third category, in which the ratio of external costs to external
benefits is high, and transaction costs are high, is an area where the
externality concerns suggest that liability should be strict. The transaction cost model suggests that because bargaining is generally infeasible a liability rule rather than a property rule should apply. These are
areas of traditional strict liability, such as liability for damage caused
by wild animals, or for ultrahazardous activities.
The difference between the ultrahazardous activities included in
this category and those included in the first is explained by the traditional distinction between direct and indirect invasions. The ultrahazardous activities that fall under strict liability rather than the
more burdensome (from the plaintiff's perspective) trespass rule are
those involving violations of difficult-to-define entitlements, such as a
claim to peace and quiet, or to clean air.
Liability for damage caused by animals is an area spanning the
first and third categories. Keeping an animal that is likely to escape
and injure, such as a grizzly bear,45 would be analogous in some areas
to a nuisance, 46 and should be enjoinable unless the animal owner can
42 E.g., Curley v. Hoff, 42 A. 731 (N.J. 1899); Wonder v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 32 Md. 411
(1870); Farwell v. Boston & Worcestor R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
43 The theoretical core of the assumption of risk defense is that the plaintiff is aware of the
hazards and has implicitly accepted them in exchange for the benefits of the transaction. It
should be clear that this theory is considerably more plausible in contractual settings than in
accidents involving strangers.

44 See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSArTON § 4.30 (1995) (dis-

cussing the common-law defenses of the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence as efforts to subsidize industry).
45 Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881) (bear kept on grounds leased by gun club
escaped and attacked farmer).
46 McKinney v. City of San Francisco, 241 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). The
keeping of a bear could be considered analogous to the defendant's activity in Comminge &
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demonstrate that the community benefits in certain ways from the
animal's presence.47 If the animal injures someone, the owner should,
under this framework, be held strictly liable.48 With less dangerous
(e.g., domestic) animals that are still capable of doing harm, or in
cases in which the community does benefit from the presence of the
animal, the traditional trespass-negligence framework should apply: if
the owner sends or threatens to send the animal onto the victim's
property, trespass rules protect the victim; if the animal escapes,
against its owner's wishes, the negligence rule applies. 49
The fourth category, in which the ratio of external costs to external benefits is not high, and transaction costs are high, is an area
where the externality concerns suggest that a negligence rule should
apply. The transaction cost model suggests that because bargaining is
infeasible a liability rule should apply. This is the area in which negligence doctrine should govern. The activities are generally ones that
generate external benefits enjoyed by the class of potential victims of
accidents associated with the activity. For example, the activities of
railroads probably provided substantial free benefits, i.e., uncharged
benefits, to many of the farmers who were the victims of railroad
sparks. How should one interpret the technological benefits made
possible by the transportation developments of the nineteenth century, other than as beneficial external effects?5 0
Horwitz has argued that the negligence rule was fashioned by
courts in the early nineteenth century as a means of subsidizing industry.5 1 It is questionable whether the negligence rule developed so recently,52 but if for the sake of argument the claim is accepted as true,
under the framework presented here it would be an example of the
Geisler v. Stevenson, 13 S.W. 556 (Tex. 1890), in which the court enjoined the defendant from
maintaining a powder magazine at a place where it presented a constant threat of harm to the
plaintiff.
47 In Guzzi v. New York Zoological Soc'y, 182 N.Y.S. 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920), aff'd, 233
N.Y. 511 (1922), the court held that the defendant society, which maintained the Bronx Zoo, was
not on the basis of strict liability liable for injury to a girl who crept under the cage of a bear, and
that the cages did not constitute a nuisance per se, because the animals were maintained as a
public enterprise for educational purposes and to entertain the public.
48 The law is consistent with this proposition. If an animal is dangerous or has shown a
tendency to attack, the owner will be held strictly liable for injuries. See Harvey v. Buchannan,
49 S.E. 281 (Ga. 1904) (surprisingly vicious mule); Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.
1974) (boar); Baker v. Snell, [19081 2 K.B. 825 (vicious dog); Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., 25 Q.B.D. 258 (1890) (elephant); May v. Burdett, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (Q.B. 1846)
(monkey).
49 See Baker, 2 K.B., at 825.
50 For an impressive discussion of the beneficial external effects of the transportation and
communication revolutions caused by the railroads, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VisIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BusINEss 188-239 (1977).
51 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 85-99

(1977).
52 HoLMEs, supra note 7, at 77-107.
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tort law's evolution toward economic efficiency. Note that this is different from Posner's critique of the subsidy thesis. 53 Posner argued
that strict liability acts as a tax on the activity, so that if in fact there
was a shift toward negligence in the early nineteenth century it should
be interpreted as the removal of a tax instead of the introduction of a
subsidy.54 But the problem with this argument, and the reason it is
not responsive to Horwitz's thesis, is that it fails to tell us why the tax
should have been removed. Under the theory that liability rules are
efforts to internalize costs to decision makers, strict liability is the appropriate rule because it leads to optimal care and activity-level
decisions.
The model presented here explains why the tax should have been
removed, or alternatively, why the subsidy should have been introduced. The railroads played an important role in industrial development and probably not all of the benefits flowing from their activity
were captured through the pricing of transportation services. The
adoption of the negligence rule, whether viewed as the removal of a
tax or as a subsidy, can be justified as an efficient response to benefits
externalized by railroads. 55 An efficiency justification for the asserted
shift toward negligence, similar to the one advanced here, was tentatively offered by Calabresi. 56 He noted that railroad transportation
was an increasing-returns-to-scale-industry, in the sense that it was an
industry in which fixed costs, e.g., equipment, structures, were predominant, and that a subsidy provided to such an industry could generate gains in consumers surplus that outweighed the
expected
57
accident losses associated with a higher scale of output.
The framework of this Article also provides an explanation of the
exception to the ad coelurn rule observed with respect to airplane
overflights. 58 Like railroads, the existence of air transportation ser53 Posner, supra note 7, at 29.
54 Id. at 30.
55 Indeed, the courts were telling us this in the plainest language in the nuisance cases. See
Lexington & Ohio R.R. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289, 309 (1839) (stating that "railroads
and locomotive steamcars-the offsprings, as they will also be the parents, of progressive improvement-should not, in themselves, be considered as nuisances, although, in ages that are
gone, they might have been so held, because they would have been comparatively useless, and,
therefore, more mischievous"); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484-85 (1873) ("We must have
factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded by our civilization. If I
have any of these upon my lands, and they are not so a nuisance and are not managed as to
become such, I am not responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my
neighbor. He receives his compensation for such damage by the general good, in which he
shares, and the right which he has to place the same things upon his lands.").
56 Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 515-16 (1961).
57 Id. at 516.
58 Ad coelum refers to the traditional rule recognizing as a trespass any intentional, direct,
physical invasion of the column of space extending from the center of the earth to the heavens.
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vice provides benefits that are widely distributed and probably not
fully captured through the pricing of the service.
Some tension apparently exists between this argument and the
basic proposition that markets encourage wealth enhancing activities
in the sense that an activity that survives in the market is one that

generates net social benefits-in other words, social benefits in excess
of costs. But the market test is conservative. An activity that can sustain itself in the market is likely to be one that generates benefits in
excess of costs. The converse is not necessarily true: an activity that
generates benefits in excess of costs will not necessarily be able to
sustain itself. The reason is that in the case of an activity that generates external costs, those who are adversely affected will have an incentive to try to shift those costs back to the source, or to any party
upon whom the costs can be shifted. An activity that generates external benefits will not present the same incentives to those affected; they
will have little incentive to shift the benefits back to the source. This
is the primary reason why the public goods problem has been accepted by economists, since Adam Smith, as a justification for government intervention in the marketplace.
Merrill noted that the exception to the ad coelum rule in the area
of airplane overflights can be explained by the transaction cost
model. 59 For example, it would be prohibitively costly for the airplane
owner to identify and negotiate for the rights to pass through the columns of space belonging to various owners of land, and it would be
costly for the owners to detect and monitor compliance with the terms
of the agreements. 60 This is a very sensible explanation, but the problem with relying on the transaction cost model generally is that in itself it can explain neither the Rylands doctrine nor much of nuisance
law. With both sparks from passing trains and airplane overflights,
the transaction cost and externality concerns justify the adoption of
the negligence rule.
The foregoing can be summarized by the following table:

According to the Restatement "Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a
trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land,
and (b) it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of his land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159.2 (1977).
59 Merrill, supra note 16, at 36.
60 Id.

A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law

90:977 (1996)

FIGURE

External Costs
greater than
External Benefits
External Costs
less than
External Benefits
IV.

2

Transaction Costs
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Transaction Costs
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NUISANCE LAW

Blackstone put private nuisances into two general categories:
those affecting tangible property, such as land, and those affecting intangible property, such as a claim to a stream of rents or profits.6 1 The
first category was further subdivided into those affecting dwellings,
which primarily consisted of cases of (1) overhanging, (2) stopping ancient lights, and (3) corruption of the air; and those affecting land,
such as a smelting house whose smoke causes damage to grass or cattle, or the diversion or pollution of a stream that runs into another's
land. Overhanging is a type of trespass,6 2 and the doctrine of ancient
lights has been rejected in American courts, 63 leaving largely activities
that affect air or water as the subject of nuisance law in American
courts.
This section extends the framework presented in Part ]I and uses
it to explain nuisance doctrine, specifically the distinction between
suits in which damages are awarded and those in which an injunction
is issued. This Part also discusses the role of intent in nuisance doctrine, and closes with a comment on public nuisance law.
A.

Abatement Versus Compensation

The framework presented in the previous Part is capable of offering a coherent explanation of nuisance doctrine, and goes further in
this area than the Calabresi-Melamed transaction cost framework.
The transaction cost theory does not generate an explanation for the
different tests applied in suits for damages and in cases in which injunctive relief is sought. Further, the transaction cost theory does not
explain the role of intent in nuisance and in trespass doctrine. In this
61 3 WILLIAM B.AcKsroN, COMMENTARIES 216-19 (15th ed. 1809).

62 For this reason, trespass has been considered the appropriate action. See, e.g., P.H. Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189, 203 (1931).

63 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959). But there is evidence that the doctrine of ancient lights exists in a somewhat
weaker form. See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982) (recognizing easements for light
going to solar heating panels).
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subpart, I demonstrate that the "missing markets" theory presented
here is capable of explaining these long-standing features of tort law.
The legal test that determines whether the victim of a nuisance
will be compensated is not entirely clear. Some courts have suggested
that the plaintiff need go no further than to demonstrate that the harm
is substantial. 64 On the other extreme are courts that have discussed
nuisance doctrine as if traditional negligence principles govern the determination of liability. 65 Damages are awarded in a nuisance dispute
if the interference with protected interests is deemed unreasonable.
According to Prosser, courts consider the following factors in determining whether an interference is unreasonable: the gravity of the
harm resulting from the interference, which is a function of extent and
duration; the character of the harm, whether it is physical damage or
personal discomfort; the relative capacity of the plaintiff and the defendant to bear the loss, or to avoid the harm by taking relatively inexpensive precautions; and the nature of the locality and priority in
time.

66

I will rely on Prosser's formulation of the reasonableness standard in nuisance doctrine. The assertion that negligence principles
govern in this area cannot be squared with the many cases finding that
the defendant's activity was an
unreasonable interference and that the
67
defendant was not negligent.
Injunctive relief is granted when the defendant's conduct in carrying on the activity in the place and at the time the injunction is sought
is unreasonable. 6 8 The doctrine governing the court's decision has
been referred to as "balancing the equities," which requires a weigh64 Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969).
65 Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977). The negligence

approach seems to have been taken in Restatement § 826, which defines unreasonable interference as follows:

An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if (a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct, or (b) the harm
caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and
similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1977). For an argument that negligence principles
should govern where the harm is not intentional, see Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory
Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REv. 984 (1952).
66 PROSSER, supra note 17, at 596-602; see also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 630 (5th ed. 1984).

67 Rhoades v. Cook, 98 N.W. 122 (Iowa 1904); Gilbert v. Davidson Constr. Co., 203 P. 1113
(Kan. 1922); Whittemore v. Baxter Laundry Co., 148 N.W. 437 (Mich. 1914); Longtin v. Persell,
76 P. 699 (Mont. 1904); Beecher v. Dull, 143 A. 498 (Pa. 1928); Gossett v. Southern Ry., 89 S.W.
737 (Tenn. 1905); see also 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.24 (2d ed. 1986);
Winfield, supranote 62, at 199-201. It has been argued that the importation of negligence principles into nuisance law was the result of an "incautious obiter dictum." See F. H. Newark, The
Boundariesof Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480 (1949).
68 PROSSER, supra note 17, at 604.
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ing of hardships and interests at issue. 69 Under this doctrine the court
will deem the conduct unreasonable if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the conduct.
The different doctrinal tests governing suits for damages and suits
for injunctive relief are not entirely clear, and have generated confusion by suggesting that an activity can be reasonable and yet the resulting interference may be unreasonable. 70 The framework of this
Article explains the different tests.
1. Compensation Test.-The theory presented here suggests that
damages should be awarded, under the strict liability rule that applies
to unreasonable interferences, when the external costs generated by
the activity exceed the external benefits by a substantial margin.. The
several-part test summarized by Prosser can be understood as a way of
determining the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits.
The first factor, the amount of harm resulting from the interference,
attempts to measure the externalized costs. The relative capacity factor allows the court to consider externalized benefits. If the injury
appears small in relation to the externalized benefits, the court is unlikely to find the interference unreasonable. The locality and priority
factors can also be used to gain a sense of the reasonableness of expectations. Presumably one would move into an industrial area because of the benefit from being close to factories, for example, the
benefit from being close to work or to suppliers and other businesses
attracted to the area. The factory owners will not be able to capture
all of these benefits through the prices charged for their goods. Some
externalization of benefits is unavoidable. If all local residents took
advantage of the externalized benefits and demanded compensation
for all of the externalized costs, the activity levels of manufacturers
would be pushed below the social optimum. An optimal implicit contract would be one that required local residents who enjoy the externalized benefits to bear also some of the externalized costs. The terms
of such a contract would constitute the reasonable expectations of the
parties to a nuisance dispute. The question in a nuisance dispute
would be whether the offensive behavior violates the implicit contract
between the factory owner and local residents.
2. Abatement Test.-An injunction should be granted under the
theory of this Article when the total social costs of the activity exceed
the social benefits. Similarly, for any discrete reduction in activity
level (short of a total shutdown) the relevant question is whether the
marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs. The obvious reason for
69 Id.

70 E.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682 (N.C. 1953) (dismissing defendant's
argument that a reasonable activity can be a nuisance only if carried out in a negligent manner).
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this rule is that any activity that generates greater social costs than
social benefits is one that drains wealth from society. The total social
benefits from any activity are equal to the sum of private and external
benefits (TB = PB + EB). Total social costs equal the sum of private
costs and external costs (TC = PC + EC).
Under the framework proposed here, damages should be
awarded when
EC > EB.
An activity should be enjoined when

TC>TB
or alternatively when,
(PB - PC) + EB < EC.
I refer to this as the injunction or "total shut-down" condition. Thus,
an injunction should require not only that the external costs exceed
the external benefits, but that they differ by an amount that exceeds
the net private benefit.
This framework can be illustrated in greater detail with an example. Consider a factory that emits smoke. The net private benefit is
the joint surplus generated by contractual relationships between the
nuisance generator and the community. It is the sum of enterprise
profits, consumer surplus, i.e., net benefits, going to local consumers, 71
72
and economic rent going to employees of the enterprise in the area.
These are considered private benefits because they are (presumably)
taken into account by all parties in the contracting relationship.73 The
external costs and benefits are, by definition, not taken into account in
the private contracting process. For example, the smoke emitted by
the factory is assumed not to have been taken into account by the
local residents, whether or not they are employees of the factory or
consumers of the factory's output. The external benefits are benefits
71 Consumer surplus refers to the net benefits, which is the difference between benefits and
costs, received by consumers from purchasing a good in the market. Consider one consumer
who values a good at $10 per unit. If the market price of the good is $5 per unit, the "consumer
surplus" or net benefit enjoyed by that consumer is $5 per unit of the good consumed. For
elaboration, see HIRSHLEIER, supra note 38, at 204-06.

72 Economic rent refers to net benefits to suppliers. For example, someone willing to work
for $5 per hour and who receives a wage of $10 per hour, receives an economic rent of $5 per
hour. For elaboration, see HIPSHLEIFER, supranote 38, at 376-77.
73 Here I am making the rather standard assumption that consumers are aware of the important price and quality characteristics of the goods they purchase and that workers are aware of
their wages, hours, and conditions of work. If either consumers misperceive the characteristics
of their products or workers misperceive their work conditions, "perceived consumer surplus"
and "perceived economic rent" will differ from their actual amounts. Expansions of tort liability
in order to correct for these misperceptions can therefore be justified. See A. Michael Spence,
Consumer Misperception, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 561
(1977).
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the local community enjoys from the presence of the factory that are
not taken into account in private contracting: suppliers and purchasers brought into the area, local jobs created outside of the plant, public goods such as infrastructure (roads, sewage, power), and local tax
contributions (financing, e.g., law enforcement) supported by the
plant.
The proposed framework suggests that for an injunction to be issued, the interference must at least be unreasonable. In examining
this issue the court should focus largely on the interference itself and
ask whether its cost is largely offset by externalized benefits enjoyed
by the victim or victims. If the answer is negative, the shutdown condition is considered. Under the proposed framework the court would
try to determine whether the costs generated by the interference are
larger than the sum of the external benefits, profits, rents, and consumer surplus generated by the activity. Of course, the court practically could not be expected to calculate all of these items; the test
would have to be conducted in the rough, qualitative balancing manner used in applying the Learned Hand test.74 In this phase of the
test, the court would consider the impact of job loss and the loss of the
factory's output on the community.
One might argue that under this theory the court should never
have to issue an injunction. Any time the external costs exceeded the
external benefits by a large enough amount, the tortfeasor would prefer to shut down rather than pay damages, which should be set at a
level that approximates the external cost. However, this argument
forces us to return to one of the justifications for property rule protection. An injunction does not really shut down an enterprise. Its real
message is that the enterprise must stop its nuisance-generating activity unless it is able to pay the external costs, subjectively measured. In
this sense, property rule protection provides a stronger guarantee that
the nuisance will not recur unless the source is able to really compensate victims. 75 This rule is applied only when the difference between
external costs and benefits is large enough to satisfy the shutdown
condition. 76
It happens that the shutdown test proposed here is consistent
with the general balancing-of-equities language in the cases. How74 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
75 This requires the enterprise to compensate victims for losses that could not be easily measured by courts. For example, the value of an asset that is traded in a thin market may not be
fully taken into account under a damages scheme. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary
Economic Rationalefor ExtraordinaryLegal Sanctions, 78 CAL- L. REv. 1 (1990).
76 One might wonder whether this argument is inconsistent with the framework of the previous section, which generates four categories of liability rule. See supra Figure 1 accompanying
note 34. However, the discussion surrounding Figure 1 assumes total benefits of the defendant's
activity exceed total costs. In this section, we are talking about a different area altogether, where
total benefits fall below total costs.
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ever, the balancing-of-equities language is too general to cite as evidence that courts follow the approach suggested by this framework.
The cases themselves provide a better illustration of the applicability
and usefulness of the framework.
3. Cases.-Recall that there are two types of nuisance cases:
decisions to award damages and decisions to enjoin a nuisance. I refer
to the former as "unreasonable interference" and the latter as "unreasonable activity" cases. The unreasonable interference cases are consistent with the external cost-external benefit test outlined above, and
the unreasonable activity tests are consistent with the total cost-total
benefit test.
Berg v. Reaction Motors Division77 presents a simple illustration
of the ideal nuisance test described in this section. For more than a
year, the defendant-pursuant to its X-15 supersonic airplane production contract with the Air Force-regularly test-fired a rocket engine.
Homeowners near the test site repeatedly complained about the
noise, vibrations, and air blasts. The court found that this was an unreasonable interference, treating the defendant's activity as analogous
78
to blasting and classifying it as ultrahazardous.
The classification of the defendant's activity as ultrahazardous
was a conclusory label that explained the court's decision without telling us why it was right. Under the framework of this section, any
ultrahazardous activity that causes harm is an unreasonable interference. 79 The reason is that an ultrahazardous activity is one that externalizes costs far in excess of externalized benefits.
However, the converse of the rule suggested by Berg is not implied by the framework of this section: any unreasonable interference
is not necessarily an ultrahazardous activity. A finding of an unreasonable interference merely requires that, in expectation, the costs imposed on the victim considerably exceed externalized benefits. An
ultrahazardous activity will satisfy this condition easily, but an activity
that is not ultrahazardous may also satisfy it. This point is illustrated
by Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative,80 in which farmers complained of crop damage caused by sulphur-dioxide emissions from a
coal-burning electricity generating plant. The court found that the defendant's activity led to an unreasonable interference without having
77 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962).
78 Id.
79 This should not be taken to suggest that anything that violates the Rylands doctrine is a
nuisance. A tortfeasor can violate the Rylands doctrine without disturbing the victim's use and
enjoyment of land, as in the case of a tiger that escapes and bites the victim on public property.
For a careful discussion of the points that distinguish nuisance and ultrahazardous activity
claims, see Winfield, supra note 62, at 192-97.
80 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1970).
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to classify the activity as abnormal in any sense.8 ' Indeed, the run-ofthe-mill nuisance case probably involves an activity that is not abnormally dangerous, but results in physical invasions that are considered
by the court simply to be too much to ask the victim to bear. s2
A further illustration of the balancing of external benefits and
external costs in unreasonable interference decisions is provided by
Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp.8 3 Waste substances from the defend-

ant's oil refinery regularly escaped from the defendant's land by underground percolation. As a result, the well and stream on the
plaintiff's farm became polluted with gasoline. As a result farm animals were killed. The court found that the interference was not
unreasonable.8 4
The court's rationale reveals that it essentially compared the costs
and benefits externalized to the victim in light of reasonable expectations of the parties. First, it noted that the expected cost seemed to be
small; in the court's words, the harm to the victim from the pollution
of subterranean water was not a foreseeable injury.85 Second, the
court discussed the value of the defendant's business to the local
community:
This plant is situated in the heart of a region that is highly developed
industrially. Here it prepares for use and distributes a product that has
become one of the prime necessities of modem life. It is an unavoidable
incident of the growth of population and its segregation in restricted areas that individual rights recognized in a sparsely settled state have to be
surrendered
for the benefit of the community as it develops and
6
expands.8
Thus it seemed important to the court that the defendant's business
had contributed substantially to the industrial development of the
community-an externalized benefit that the plaintiff enjoyed-and
that the community had changed to the point that it was no longer
81 Id.

82 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A cmts. (1977) (discussing the unrea-

sonable interference test).
One reason to expect the typical nuisance dispute to be of this sort is suggested by research
in the theory of litigation. In the case of an ultrahazardous activity, the defendant will generally
be as aware as the plaintiff of the likelihood of physical damage to victims. These cases are likely
to be settled. This may not describe the case in which the activity is reasonable. In many of
these cases, the defendant may not have anticipated the plaintiff's harm, and may find the plaintiff's claim weak. Because of the difference in expectations, these cases are more likely to be
litigated. For a general treatment of expectations and the litigation process, see Keith N. Hylton,
Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187
(1993); George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).
83 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 631-32.
86 Ld. at 631.
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reasonable for the victim to assume that he would be compensated for
his injury.
Rodgers v. Elliott8 7 can be used to elaborate on the role of reasonable expectations in the external benefit-external cost test. The
plaintiff claimed that the ringing of a church bell caused him to go into
convulsions. The court found that the interference was not unreasonable. As Rodgers makes clear, the reasonableness of an interference
is not determined by the preferences of the victim, but by those of a
hypothetical typical member of the community. Although the external cost-external benefit test, as envisioned here, examines the costs
and benefits imposed on the victim, and for that reason is capable of
finding an interference unreasonable even though the activity is not
ultrahazardous, it does not measure the costs and benefits subjectively. Several reasons can be given for this. One is the difficulty of
assessing the validity of the plaintiff's claim of injury if the external
cost-external benefit test were based on a subjective evaluation. Another reason, which is central to the argument of this Article, is that if
the unreasonable interference test is to mean anything to the potential
tortfeasor, it must be based on central tendencies instead of outliers.
How otherwise, can a set of expectations concerning lawful conductin effect an implicit contract between potential injurers and victimsbe formed? A third reason is quite similar to the second, but doctrinal in emphasis. Nuisance is an intentional invasion in the sense that
the injurer must have or should have been aware of the injury to the
victim. But the expectations that would support a finding of an intentional violation could never be formed if the unreasonable interference test were based on subjective evaluations.
Although the unreasonable interference test cannot be based on
subjective evaluations, the test should be based on the perspective of a
typical member drawn from the appropriately defined community or
locality. If the essence of an unreasonable interference is a violation
of an implicit contract, it must be based on the expectations of the
class of potential injurers and victims. For example, the regular ringing of a bell in a community of Trappist Monks could be an unreasonable interference.
Priority is obviously important in determining reasonable expectations. One who moves into an industrial area presumably does so
because the unpaid-for benefits outweigh the uncompensated-for
costs, and compensation is often received ex ante in the form of lower
property prices. The act of "coming to the nuisance" should be
viewed as a statement from the perspective of the second mover that
the external benefits exceed the external costs generated by the offensive activity. However, priority is not dispositive. If the relevant com87 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888).
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munity changes, the underlying expectations regarding lawful conduct
should also change. If a city were to grow around a community of
Trappist Monks, the ringing of a bell would not remain an unreasonable interference indefinitely. 88
The major distinction between the unreasonable activity and unreasonable interference decisions is that one generally finds discussion
of potential losses in profits, investment, jobs, and output in balancing
the costs and benefits of issuing an injunction.8 9 This is obviously consistent with the theoretical framework of this section. One might argue that this is to be expected because the court should be concerned
about the economic consequences of shutting an enterprise down.
But the issuance of an injunction does not generally result in a shutdown: the general result is a requirement that the nuisance creator
buy out the holder of the injunction. 90 The discussion of profit, output, and job loss, as if these were likely to result, is a fiction. Further,
even when only damages are awarded there is likely to be some loss of
profits, with an effect on output and jobs. Thus, abatement cases cannot be distinguished from compensation cases on the ground that only
in the former is there likely to be a drastic effect on economic
conditions.
The question is why nuisance doctrine requires a consideration of
profits, output, and jobs in abatement cases and not in compensation
cases? The reason suggested by this model is that if the external costs
(EC) of the activity exceed the sum of the external benefits (EB) and
net private benefits (PB-PC)-measured in the rough manner the
courts use-it is likely that the entire activity drains wealth from society. Under these conditions property rule protection ensures, to the
victim, that the offensive activity will not have an incentive to operate
ifin fact it drains society's wealth. This is superior to the court itself
deciding whether to shut down an enterprise on the basis of the total
cost-total benefit test, because the court does not have enough information to do an accurate cost-benefit test, and therefore may errone88 The process happened in reverse, making a nuisance out of an activity that was not an
unreasonable interference at its inception, in Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948), in
which a dog-breeder's business became a nuisance within the community that developed around
it.
89 See, e.g., Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 352 P.2d 235,237 (Idaho 1960) (declining an injunction, noting that it would cost 1000 jobs and that the plant represented a substantial capital
investment); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); Whalen v. Union Bag
& Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913); Crushed Stone Co. v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811 (Okla. 1962);
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666-67 (Tenn. 1904) (finding
the defendant liable but refusing to grant an injunction because it would result in the destruction
of two mining companies along with half of the county's tax base, driving 10,000 people from
their homes).
90 See e.g., W. Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on "Balancingthe Equities," 18 TEx.
L. REv. 412, 416 (1940).
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ously shut down or fail to shut down an enterprise. Issuing an
injunction effectively puts the shutdown decision in the hands of informed parties.
B.

The Role of Intent in Nuisance Doctrine and Tort
Law Generally

I noted earlier that the Calabresi-Melamed transaction cost
framework fails to provide an adequate theory to explain the intent
requirement of nuisance doctrine. The internalization theory does
somewhat poorer by suggesting that intent should be irrelevant. The
"missing markets" theory of this Article provides an explanation of
the intent requirement.
Few attempts have been made in the law and economics literature to justify a finding of intent as a requirement of any liability rule.
I am aware of two theories that have been offered to justify intent
requirements in criminal law. The first was by Holmes, who argued in
his lecture on criminal law that intent was used by courts to infer
whether the act was one that was likely to cause harm. 9 1 If an intent
to harm was found, the act was one that carried a high probability of
injury, and criminal punishment would be justified. 9 2 An alternative
theory of the requirement of criminal intent was offered by Gary
Becker in his article on punishment. 93 Becker's explanation was
based on the existence of nonmonetary punishments. He argued that
nonmonetary punishment was similar to using command and control
instead of price as a way of guiding behavior because it required a
great deal of information in order to be used optimally. 94 Specifically,
an optimal system of nonmonetary punishment required information
on the elasticity of the supply of offenses. 95 Evidence of criminal intent could be used to make inferences concerning the elasticity of the
96
supply of offenses.
The criminal law theories cannot be used to explain the intent
requirement of nuisance doctrine. The problem with applying
Holmes's argument in this area is that it is inconsistent with the doctrinal formulation of intent in nuisance and trespass law. The type of
intent that is required in nuisance law is a type of "general" intent:
intent to be involved in the activity and (perhaps) knowledge that it is
91 HoLMEs, supra note 7, at 67-68.
92 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 1193,
1221-22 (1985) (arguing the same).
93 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment"An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL ECON. 169
(1968).
94 Id.

95 I&
96 Id. at 194.
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causing injury. 97 There is no requirement that the tortfeasor intend to
harm the victim. With respect to the greater or more serious criminal
acts, however, that is precisely the type of intent sought by the prosecution.98 The Becker argument is also inconsistent with the intent requirement of nuisance law, and is inapplicable anyway because it
assumes nonmonetary punishment.
A third theory of the intent requirement was suggested in
Holmes's lecture on tort doctrine. 99 Holmes noted that to be guilty of
trespass one had to act voluntarily, which is an intent requirement of
sorts.100 One could establish a defense to a trespass claim by proving
that the act was not voluntarily-for example, that the tortfeasor was
thrown from his horse onto the victim's property. However, in the
case of an intentional invasion, a court would not recognize as a defense the assertion that the tortfeasor did not know that the property
belonged to the victim.10 ' Holmes argued that this was the appropriate intent requirement because the injury caused by the violation of a
property right should be internalized to the responsible party.
The justification offered here for the intent requirement in nuisance law is similar to and extends Holmes's theory of the intent requirement for trespass. An interference is unreasonable and
therefore a nuisance, under the framework of this Article, when the
external benefits exceed the external costs associated with the offensive activity. Strict liability is appropriate because it fully internalizes
losses, and by so doing pushes activity levels toward the social optimum. The intent requirement in nuisance doctrine is a device for distinguishing those tortfeasors who are intentionally or at least
voluntarily engaged in the injury-causing activity from those who are
not. If the choice of the activity was not intentional or voluntary, or
the defendant had no way of knowing of the plaintiff's injury, strict
liability would do nothing to alter the defendant's activity level choice.
The famous "squib" case, Scott v. Shepherd,10 2 remains interesting precisely because the behavior of the parties involved fell on the
97 See PROSSER, supra note 17, at 574-75.
98 For many crimes, particularly violent crimes, proof of "specific intent" (an intent to do the
harm that resulted, or to violate the statute in question) is required. See, e.g., WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AusrnN W. Scorr, JR., CrIMINAL LAW 216-17, 224 (2d ed. 1986).

An alternative perspective on the different intent requirements of criminal and tort law is
provided by examining excuses or justification. Self-defense is an excuse to a criminal charge
such as homicide. But if the defendant were to run onto the plaintiff's property in an effort to
escape someone who is out to kill him, he would still be liable for damage to the plaintiff's
property, even though modem trespass law is said to recognize a privilege in this instance. See,
e.g., HARPER, supra note 67, § 1.22, at 71.
99 HoLMEs, supra note 7, at 83-84, 96-98.
100 Id.

101 See e.g., Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306 (1863).
102 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
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borderline between intentional and involuntary activity. Certainly the
behavior of the defendant who threw the lighted squib into the marketplace was intentional. But the difficult question in Scott is how to
characterize the behavior of the people who threw the squib around in
an effort to escape the danger. Blackstone thought that each throwing
of the squib should be characterized as intentional, and therefore an
independent trespass. 10 3 The majority thought these acts should be
considered involuntary, leaving the defendant who threw the squib
into the market place guilty of trespass.104 Scott falls within the framework of this Article rather easily in the sense that the behaviorthrowing an explosive into a crowded area-is an activity whose external costs far exceed its external benefits. The difficulty arises because there is a conflict between the rigid doctrinal approach of
Blackstone and what the theory of this Article suggests should be the
result. The theory suggests that the activity that should be penalized
by a strict liability rule is the act of the defendant, bringing the lighted
squib into the area. But the formulation of the intent requirement in
trespass doctrine lends support to Blackstone's view.
Scott v. Shepherd was decided correctly under the theory of this
Article. The purpose of strict liability is to internalize costs in a way
that affects activity level choices. In Scott two sets of choices were to
be examined: the decision by the defendant to throw the squib into
the marketplace and a second set consisting of the decision of each
individual along the way to throw the squib in order to escape the
blast. The decision of the defendant was apparently intentional. The
decision of the last individual to throw the squib before it injured the
plaintiff probably should not be characterized as intentional and perhaps not even voluntary. Somewhere between these points the act
changed from intentional to unintentional. It would be very hard to
fix the point at which this change occurred. The obvious solution is to
draw the line after the first act.
It is important to distinguish this explanation from the internalization theory. The internalization principle fails to explain Scott v.
Shepherd because it implies joint and several liability for all of the
actors. Even though the last individual to hold the squib did not intend to throw it in the direction of the victim, he was aware of the
potential harm. The internalization theory presumably requires nothing more than perception of harm. The injurer who correctly perceives the harm to others will be encouraged by liability to take that
harm into account. Blackstone's conclusion, though reached on doctrinal grounds, is supported by the internalization theory.

103 Id.
104 Id
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The framework presented here and the internalization theory
both point to similar conclusions when the question is whether the
injurer perceived the harm. A sufficient condition for strict liability
under either theory is the defendant's intentional or voluntary involvement in an activity that is ultrahazardous. The mere performance of an act that is very likely to cause harm is different. For
example, moving explosives would be an ultrahazardous activity. The
activity of moving items generally would not be classified as ultrahazardous. A moving company that unknowingly happens to be
shipping explosives among other items that belong to its customer
would not be involved in an ultrahazardous activity. There would
have been no decision on the mover's part to participate in an activity
that is likely to lead to injury.
C. Public Nuisance
Although I have focused on private nuisance doctrine, the framework of this Article provides an answer to a long-standing puzzle in
public nuisance law. The rule has been that a private individual cannot sue for the invasion of a public right, such as the right to use a
public highway, unless his harm is distinguishable from the harms suffered generally by affected members of the public. 10 5 The prevailing
theory is that the particular harm requirement "relieves the defendant
of the multiplicity of actions which might follow if everyone were free
to sue for the common harm."'1 6 The theory suffers from at least
three near-fatal weakness. First, if the common harm is small, there
would be little incentive to sue since the cost of a suit would likely
exceed the damage award. Second, if the harm is truly common, public goods theory would suggest that only those who suffered unusually
large damages would have an incentive to sue anyway. Third, nothing
prevents a victim from bringing a negligence suit for the harm suffered, however common, so the multiplicity-of-suits problem remains.
The particular harm requirement is an important feature of public nuisance doctrine, not merely a procedural device. It is foreseeable
that the right to use a public highway will occasionally be denied by
the presence of some obstruction. If N members of the public use a
single-lane highway once every day, and the probability of breakdown
on a given day is p for each member, on any given day pN obstructions will occur. The harms will be evenly distributed in the long run.
The benefit to A of not being forced to compensate others when A
causes the obstruction is offset by the expected cost to A of the obstructions caused by others. Only when the harm suffered is unusual
105 PROSSER, supra note 17, at 586.
106 Id. at 587.
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will the externalized costs suffered by the victim exceed the unpaid-for
benefits.
V.

FAIRNESS AND UTILITY REVISITED

The theory presented here is in many respects similar to the reciprocity theory advanced by George Fletcher. 0 7 Fletcher argued that
areas of strict liability and negligence could be explained by simply
asking whether the risks thrown off by the parties to the dispute were
reciprocal. 0 8 An example of "nonreciprocal risk" would be the risk
that an airplane flying overhead imposes on homeowners on the
ground below its flight path. Two planes flying in the air create reciprocal risks. Liability for ultrahazardous activity is an example of a
pocket of strict liability that can be explained by the nonreciprocality
of risks.
The theory of this Article can be used to justify the pockets of
strict liability justified by Fletcher. An area in which risks are
nonreciprocal is one in which the externalized costs from the defendant's activity far exceed the externalized benefits. An area in which
risks are reciprocal, so that the negligence rule applies, could be described as one in which externalized costs are not far greater than externalized benefits. The model of this Article also explains the
adoption as custom, or as common law, of a rule of no liability. The
norm of reciprocity among rancher-farmers in Shasta County described by Ellickson, 0 9 which is essentially a no liability rule for lowlevel damages, is consistent with the theory of this Article. In a situation where symmetric low-level damages are experienced frequently,
part of the benefit received in exchange for absorbing these losses is
the ability to externalize similar costs to others without having to compensate them, and to incur the transaction costs that would necessarily
accompany such efforts. The common law contains one important example of a no-liability rule that is entirely consistent with the custom
observed by Ellickson. A finding that a given interference is not unreasonable, and therefore not a nuisance, does not mean that it led to
no suffering whatsoever by the plaintiff. It means that the loss is one
the law requires the plaintiff to absorb because small losses are offset
over the long run by small benefits."10 Another example that is not
important today is the right of common "because of vicinage" described by Blackstone as the case where
107 George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
108 Id.
109 Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coaseand Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).

110 This is also known as the "live and let live" rule, attributed to Baron Bramwell's discussion
of low-level nuisances, such as burning weeds and emptying cesspools, in Bamford v. Turnley,
122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (1862).
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the inhabitants of two townships, which lie contiguous to each other,
have usually intercommoned with one another; the beasts of the one
straying mutually into the other's fields, without any molestation from
either. This is indeed only a permissive right, intended to excuse what in
strictness is a trespass in both, and to prevent a multiplicity of suits: and
therefore either township may enclose and bar out the other, though
they have intercommoned time out of mind. Neither hath any person of
one town a right to put his beasts originally into the other's common; but
if they escape, and stray thither of themselves, the law winks at the
trespass. 11 '
Although the theories have similar implications, the theory of this
Article goes considerably further than Fletcher's in explaining tort
doctrine. The reciprocity theory does not explain any of the areas of
tort doctrine involving contractual relationships, such as the commonlaw treatment of work-related injuries. Reciprocal risk theory would
suggest that strict employer liability should have been the rule because it is the employer who, by failing to invest adequately in safety
measures, exposes the employee to the risk of injury on the job. As
between the two, it seems that the employer throws more unanticipated risk on the employee. Any reading of work place injury cases
would suggest that the employer-employee relationship is not one of
reciprocal risk. The reciprocal risk theory fails to explain the absence
of strict liability in the common law of employer liability. The same
can be said for the doctor-patient relationship, which is obviously one
of nonreciprocal risk.
Reciprocal risk theory fails to explain defamation law and doctrine governing the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
subject of a news report does not expose the reporter or the newspaper to reputational harm. Yet liability for defamation is not generally
strict. Reciprocity theory also fails to provide a rich theory of the
structure of tort rules. It provides an explanation of pockets of strict
liability and of negligence, but does not suggest areas in which privileges or strong defenses to a negligence claim should be observed, nor
does it allow us to distinguish between the doctrinal tests governing
abatement and compensation cases in nuisance law.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that much of tort doctrine can be understood as a
response to the incompleteness of markets. This comports with the
approach suggested by Coase years ago.112 However, the modern economic and deterrence-based literature has disconnected itself from
Coase's approach and attached itself more firmly to the externality
literature by treating tort doctrine primarily as a mechanism that in111 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at 33-34.
112 Coase, supra note 11, at 19-28 (discussing nuisance law).
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ternalizes costs to relevant decision makers. Because the theory focuses on cost internalization, it is hard put to explain several areas of
tort doctrine.
Market incompleteness results in externalization of costs and
benefits. A framework that recognizes both types of externalization is
capable of explaining the general shape as well as the details of tort
law.
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